Category Archives: Capital Theory

NGDP and the Recession

One of the biggest reasons I don’t find much merit in the idea of NGDP targeting is that it’s not clear to me that changes in real GDP (RGDP) always follow changes in nominal GDP (NGDP). Likewise, I’m convinced that downward shocks to RGDP lead to downward shocks in the money supply, as opposed to vice versa. While I advocate a counter-cyclically elastic money supply, I don’t think that monetary stimulus can help avoid the correction of the real economy that results from fiduciary over-expansion. Scott Sumner’s recent post on what he would expect had the Federal Reserve begun targeting NGDP by mid-2008 only deepens my suspicions.

Sumner thinks that had the Fed been targeting NGDP in mid-2008, the financial crisis wouldn’t have happened. I find this claim very unconvincing. If we are to believe Gary Gorton, the financial crisis was mainly caused by a breakdown in wholesale credit channels, because the bulk of the collateral being used in these markets had become information sensitive. What this means is that the collateral began losing value, or trading below par, forcing investment banks, and other wholesale debtors, to increase the amount of collateral to maintain the same level of short-term borrowing. For Sumner to be right, NGDP targeting would have to, somehow, maintain the value of the collateral. The main asset acting as collateral, at the time, was the mortgage backed security (MBS), and related assets (i.e. the collateralized debt obligation [CDO]). The value of these assets were dependent on the nominal demand for housing.

Could NGDP targeting have maintained the demand for housing? The answer, in my opinion unambiguously, is ‘no.’ MBS’ are financial assets composed of mortgage debt, where the pooling of loans allows asset holders to spread the risk of loans with higher probabilities of default. Prior to the financial crisis, MBS’ were considered to be some of the safest, or relatively information insensitive, assets. Their safety, however, relied on the expectation that the default rate, on average, would be below a certain percentage. The default rate is a factor of various variables, such as homeowner income, the cost of the home, et cetera. But, during the boom, continuously rising prices effectively decreased the real cost of debt, since homeowners who couldn’t afford their mortgage could simply re-sell the house for a higher price than they bought it for — they would earn a profit! The rise in the home prices, in turn, was fed by continuous loan origination, but by 2005–06 loan originators were running out of people to loan money to.

There’s only so much room to lower lending standards. Thus, by 2005, the pace of loan origination starting to fall, and with it home prices began to plateau, then stagnate, and finally gradually fall. As home prices fell, the default rate increased. While it took roughly two years for it be obvious, the securitized assets based on these loans were also losing value — that is, the supply of safe assets shifted to the left (supply decreased). Financial firms which relied on MBS’ and CDO’s as collateral for short-term borrowing quickly saw the assets side of their balance sheet deteriorating, and this is what caused the financial crisis of 2007–09. There was a bank run. It didn’t look like a bank run, because it wasn’t ordinary depositors who were worried about banks making good of their deposit liabilities. Rather, it was wholesale depositors worried about being repaid, because it suddenly became obvious that banks simply didn’t have the assets to sell to access the liquidity to repay their debts.

The point is, for the financial crisis to have been avoided, it would have been necessary for the Fed to continue the housing boom. We normally think of Fed policy affecting asset prices more directly, but in this case the boom in asset prices was directly linked to the boom in home prices. Given the lack of a sufficient volume of new mortgage debtors, I don’t think it was possible to maintain the housing boom (not to mention it would have been undesirable).

We would have still seen the significant fall in real incomes (because of falling home prices and large household debt), and we would have still suffered from a dramatic fall in output. Wholesale credit markets would have still dried up, and banks’ would still be forced to deleverage. But, I agree with Sumner that the recession would probably have been milder had the Fed better accommodated the rise in the demand for money. This being said, I’m also sympathetic to a certain aspect of the Post Keynesian endogenous theory of money — well, actually, this is an aspect of mainstream banking theory, too (even if Post Keynesians think they’re the only ones who acknowledge it). The Fed can only accommodate the demand for money indirectly, by inducing banks to make loans. If the banking system is damaged and credit channels are dried up, then this channel becomes less effective. The same is true if uncertainty makes borrowing too costly, which is Richard Koo‘s major argument against monetary policy.

Historically (see Gorton’s Misunderstanding Financial Crises), to avoid the problem of moribund banks, there has been some process of balance sheet strengthening. For example, prior to the Federal Reserve, clearinghouses would pool member banks’ assets and issue their own currencies, almost as a temporary bailout. Following the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve bought large quantities of MBS’, but I’m not sure how effective this tactic actually was. It seemed to have a greater impact only years after the brunt of the damage had already happened.

Thus, my main concern with NGDP targeting is that the theory papers over concerns of resource misallocation. Typically, when we think of misallocation we think of too large of a housing sector, or too many construction workers, but there was also a massive misallocation of financial capital. Even if the Fed were targeting NGDP, the likelihood that the assets people had invested in at the time were going to see a large drop in value would be enough to cause a shock to RGDP, and therefore a shock to NGDP. It was out of the Fed’s control. I do think that accommodating the rise in demand for money would have eased the transition, but I don’t think this is a panacea. Also, I think there’s merit in the broad “regime uncertainty” story. I don’t believe our government suddenly became more interventionist than it was before, but I’m of the opinion that a lot of the transaction costs that make structural adjustments more difficult went, in a sense, unseen during the boom — fiduciary overexpansion made transaction costs less expensive. This is one reason why I find the “evidence” against fiscal austerity superficial and unconvincing. NGDP targeting is only a little bit less unconvincing than the case for fiscal stimulus. I prefer a Hayekian, microfounded explanation of the business cycle.

First Demand, Second Structural: Short Comment

Those that emphasize the demand-side qualities of the business cycle often like to argue that once you solve the demand shortage any structural problems will solve themselves. A Keynesian might make this argument to emphasize the importance of immediate fiscal stimulus, and market monetarists do the same to underscore the urgency of expansionary monetary policy. In theory, these economists have a point. Structural issues are easier to fix when the economy is healthy, and structural problems aside these economists usually think that demand-side stimuli is necessary, because even relatively unimpeded markets have supply-side adjustment problems.

Recent history, however, has not been so kind to those who stress demand-side over structural reforms. Consider, for example, the fact that structural problems have plagued southern Europe for decades. These issues were meant to be tackled between the 1990s and early 2000s, when these economies were first integrated into the European Union. They were also emphasized once again when the Euro began to circulate in late 2001. Yet, despite the prosperity that the boom brought with it, none of these structural issues were solved. They were simply papered over, because the boom made it seem as if these reforms weren’t even necessary. There was no pressure to solve them, because their harm was no longer as obvious.

It’s during recessions that structural problems are really felt, so it’s during the recession that there is real pressure to help reduce harmful intervention (e.g. inflexible labor markets). Because of this, it seems to me that it makes more sense to focus on supply-side issues during the recession, even if you still think that a demand-side stimulus is inevitably necessary. Not only that, but supply-side changes can affect demand. A more flexible labor market, where firms can hire people at lower cost, will stimulate the purchase of factors of production — it will shift the demand curve (and/or IS curve) to the right. It ought to be considered that supply-side changes may allow for more efficient demand-side fiscal/monetary policy.

Dealing with the Evidence

The recent challenge to a 2010 paper by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, authors of the widely acclaimed This Time is Different, has seemingly dealt a fatal blow to the case for fiscal austerity. The most well known feature of Reinhart’s and Rogoff’s research is their “debt threshold” figure, which finds that at 90 percent debt-to-GDP the average country begins to experience a negative growth rate. This has been shown to be wrong, although there is dispute on the authors’ data manipulation. Today, most major developed nations, burdened by recession, are either approaching or have surpassed a 90 percent ratio, as such Reinhart’s and Rogoff’s empirical approximation of the “threshold” seems to carry some importance. In reality, their debt cut off point probably has very little importance, and its empirical refutation does not hurt the more nuanced case for austerity. Likewise, other recent empirical research on austerity and the fiscal multiplier — the value created by each additional dollar spent by government — should be interpreted carefully, because it is not obvious that the surveyed data represents actual cases of austerity.

For what it is worth, the claim that Reinhart and Rogoff are representatives of the case for austerity is highly questionable. Their detractors accuse them of getting the causation wrong, suggesting that it is slow growth which leads to high debt-to-GDP ratios, as opposed to vice versa. However, in most of their academic work, they are careful to point this out to their readers. No less, their principle argument, that debt is not costless (see Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff [2012]) — even when treasuries yield a nearly zero percent return —, has mostly been ignored. It is quite ironic, because they have been accused of being sloppy in their research. This claim, as we have seen, is true, but much of their work can be interpreted as a means of pushing for greater nuance in the debate on debt.

The debate on public debt is not the only area where there is a lack of quality. Debt is just one facet of the problem, and, arguably, not the most important. All economic recoveries require that the private sector recover from the shock of resource misallocation, and for this to occur the institutions that govern the market must avoid setting obstacles that delay a beneficial recovery in private investment. In reality, public policy has failed to fulfill this role. It is not surprising that countries where “austerity” has performed particularly poorly are the same as those which suffer from markets with overbearing government-imposed transaction costs.

The case for austerity comes with a specific vision of the market process that often gets lost in translation. Most models are relatively general, because they necessarily abstract from most features of the real world. Economists build these models to understand the causal effects of certain actions and interventions. They are theoretical alternatives to controlled experiments, which are extremely difficult (even impossible) to conduct when studying complex phenomena. But, when it comes to policy recommendations, these models tend to be unsuitable for the task. The real world does not respect the abstraction of the model, but is instead an outcome of many causal processes occurring simultaneously. There is no ceteris paribus, so, while theory is absolutely indispensable for understanding actual economies, you need to consider the totality of theories to get an accurate picture of a live market process.

Markets are composed of individuals, each with certain ends in mind and a specific set of means to achieve these ends. Each action has costs and benefits, and the individual will have to choose which route to take based on these. As established by Mises (Mises [1920], Mises [1922]), these costs and benefits become known to us through price formation. It follows that changes to any change to these prices will also change the decisions made by individuals. The case against government spending follows from this fundamental insight, because the institution of the market provides the best disciplining process — profit and loss —, which public expenditure is not subjected to. But, public expenditure is only one facet of what “austerity” really means, because the other half of the theory calls for a private sector-led economic recovery. For this to occur, the institutions which govern the market must allow individuals to choose undisturbed and undistorted.

Consider, for example, the case of Spain. While the belief that Spain has been practicing fiscal responsibility is suspect in and of itself, there are bigger problems than public spending. The Iberian country has been suffering from structural problems for some time, even before the recent financial crisis. Spanish labor markets are inflexible, because of the various regulations of employment contracts and employee rights, and this is manifested in the country’s large informal sector. Economist Friedrich Schneider estimates that prior to 2007 Spain’s informal sector was valued at over 20 percent of the country’s GDP. This has made the economy much less competitive. Its growth during the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s was driven primarily by the European credit boom, but much of this growth occurred in sectors that later collapsed. These structural problems were recognized by most economists before the recession, and the expectation was that Spain (and countries in similar situations, including Greece and Italy) would deal with them during the boom. They did not, but after the recession many economists, for whatever reason, placed less weight on them than they did before. But, if Spanish markets are hampered to the extent that only a credit boom can bring alleged prosperity, how can we expect the private sector to recover from a major macroeconomic shock?

The situation is similar in the United States. There are uncertainties regarding the costs of hiring labor, including some past ambiguity on the costs of health care. Changes in the minimum wage will also impact the rate of hiring; an increase in the minimum wage will force firms on the margin to rethink their hiring policies, and may even force them to shed unaffordable employees. Bad monetary policy has also added to the aura ambiguity. First, there is little consideration of how bad monetary policy impacts prices, including making price adjustment more difficult. Second, as economist Jeffrey R. Hummel explains in his contribution to Boom and Bust Banking, the Federal Reserve responded to the crisis by allocating credit. This has impacted the banking system, in part protecting otherwise moribund lenders. Banks, as financial intermediaries, are indispensable to a working economy, as, ironically, argued by Ben Bernanke (Bernanke [1983]). Credit allocation may have saved some financial firms from bankruptcy, but this was done without properly considering the prospective costs — the misallocation of resources towards the financial sector and the creation of ambiguity regarding this sector’s state of health. Finally, much of public policy designed to help induce recovery has targeted consumer spending, whereas the problem is principally one of inadequate real private investment.

The theoretical point is that if economies are an aggregate of several simultaneously operating, interrelated, complex phenomena, an intervention can impede one process and therefore slow down the entire recovery. If interventions of this kind affect a significant number of different processes, then the results can be particularly damaging. This was the case, for instance, with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, as chronicled by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their seminal A Monetary History (1963). These kinds of “stimulants” are somewhat analogous to feeding a bodybuilder steroids, but simultaneously tying his arms behind his back, so that he is absolutely incapable of building muscle mass on his own.

The fundamental task to be accomplished during a recovery is the readjustment of the structure of production. This is true whether you ascribe to Austrian business cycle theory, a “demand-side” explanation, or real business cycle theory. It was intermediate supplies, or factors of production, that were most volatile during and after the boom, not consumers’ goods. It was investment which took the greatest hit, if we compare the percent decline of different aggregates. Any recovery must be a recovery in real private investment. Any policy which distorts spending in favor of consumption, at the expense of investment, will make recovery more difficult. Any policy that increases the costs of the employment of capital, including raising the costs of complimentary labor, will make the recovery more difficult. If the pricing process isn’t allowed to adjust because of an extravagant, directed monetary policy, the recovery will suffer.

Many economists will respond to the arguments made so far by arguing that the relative lack of consumption is being ignored. However, apart from the fact that the hit to consumption was relatively minor, it is important remember that present consumption does not decide the scope of present investment. All production is meant for future consumption. The prices of producers’ goods will reflect the expectations of future consumption. We know that the prices of factors of production are imputed from the final product, through the competitive bidding process of the market. If expected future consumption is relatively low, then the price of the factors of production — in the present — will fall. Price rigidity is not an adequate explanation for why this hasn’t happened, or at least why it hasn’t led to a stronger recovery. It has been five years since the financial crisis, if prices have not adjusted then the fault lies somewhere other than the market (public policy).

In more sophisticated circles, the consumption argument is no longer as widely circulated. Is the explanation to be found in interest rates? Instead, many economists have posited that the problem is that the real interest rate is somewhere below zero, and monetary policy has not helped push market interest rates to a sufficiently low level. Why do markets have trouble setting interest rates on their own? A major shock will create greater uncertainty, inducing people to look for relatively liquid forms of savings — assets they can quickly convert into other necessities, when the need for them arises. Less liquid assets must increase their attached “liquidity premium” to draw savings, otherwise people will prefer more liquid alternatives. This will push interest rates above their “natural” position.

There are a few issues with the negative interest rate theory. One concern is that, if interest is primarily decided by social time preference, it implies that people are willing to pay to have a fraction of their income temporarily taken from them. Another is that the creation of a subsidized liquid asset, like a government bond, creates an artificial alternative to other assets, increasing the liquidity premium of non-subsidized assets (which are less liquid because the risk of default is higher). If these subsidized assets did not exist, individuals would have to choose amongst alternative forms of savings, and the liquidity premia on these would be correspondingly lower. U.S. treasuries are often shown as evidence that the natural rate of interest is below zero, because people are essentially paying to invest in short-term treasuries. If the rate of interest on public bonds is artificially low, due to their subsidized nature, then these are not good indicators. Further, since inflation erodes the real value of the dollar (and, thus, the real value of interest), any inflation will seem to lower real interest rates further, simply because the market cannot raise the inflation premium. They cannot compete with the subsidized rates of public bonds during a period in time where there is so much uncertainty.

Ultimately, a flight to public debt creates the dual problem of misallocated resources and a crowded out private market. The misallocation occurs out of virtue of public expenditure: the institutions of public governance are not good at disciplining bad investments. The crowding out is not just an issue of real resources being drawn away from the private sector. It is also an issue of making the private sector uncompetitive, especially the all-important market of financial intermediation. If Gresham’s Law says that bad money drives out good money when the price of the former is held artificially high, we could call the current situation the Gresham’s Law of public debt.

The narrative told here finds its foundations in Robert Higgs’ theory of regime uncertainty (Higgs [1997]). The basic idea is that during a recession uncertainty is an added cost, and any policy which adds to it will raise the price of using the market. This will necessarily hamper a private recovery. Regime uncertainty is ridiculed by other economists, often referred to as the “confidence fairy,” but such characterizations would only be true of an extremely uncharitable interpretation. In reality, regime uncertainty is a theory which considers the complexity of the market process in its totality and recognizes that hampering the individual processes of the market can lead to relatively sub-optimal macroeconomic outcomes. Considering the weaknesses of competing theories, it is these theories that are unsophisticated.

More importantly, returning to the central thread of this argument, the empirical arguments against austerity are biased. Even humoring the notion that developing countries have practiced policies of austerity, which is an already contentious claim, the fact remains that without serious market reform the recovery will remain agonizing. It is no surprise that it is the least flexible markets — e.g. Spain, Greece, et cetera — that are preforming the worst. Studies which track the performance and spending patterns of countries supposedly being subjected to “austerity” (which usually means spending increases under the Keynesian ideal) are not making fair comparisons. What is needed is a lifting of restrictions on the market processes’ allocation of factors of production. So far, this point has been lost to fiscal doves, and we are worse off because of it.

The RBCs of ABCT

Lars Christensen has had a series of posts on Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) as a supply-side shock, his latest one being “Spain’s Quasi-Depression.” I disagree with Lars that ABCT is primarily about a supply-side shock, and I’ve made the case of interpreting ABCT as a demand-side shock in detail before. The only reason output contracts is because of a demand shock. Phantom profits come from an increased demand for certain inputs during the boom, and the boom turns to bust only when this source of demand dries up. This is why the prices of capital goods go down during the bust, and up during the boom. I think a good way of differentiating supply- and demand-side recessions is that in the former the shock leads to a price change, whereas in the latter a change in prices is itself the shock.

What I find interesting about Christensen’s post is his reference to Steve Horwitz and Roger Garrison, writing that they argue that only the subsequent monetary contraction can explain the extent of the bust. Lars quotes Horwitz, but I think he doesn’t interpret the excerpt consistently. ABCT is about the bust, and it explains the bust to some extent. Horwitz’ argument is that there’s more to the bust than ABCT, including things like “secondary deflation” — I’d also add that since a shock is bound to change individuals’ utility functions, the pre-bust era can tell us nothing about what the capital structure ought to look like following the bust. I agree, though, that any explanation of a recession will have to include an analysis of the effects of the secondary deflation, or the monetary contraction following the bust.

If we relied only on the secondary deflation to explain the bust ABCT turns into a kind of real business cycle (RBC) model. In a basic RBC model you have an initial shock — call it a “technology shock” — and then a propagation mechanism spreads this shock to the whole economy, causing a recession/depression. If Lars’ interpretation of ABCT were true, then the malinvestment would represent the shock and the secondary deflation would be the propagation mechanism. I actually think that to some extent this is true, but it’s not the whole story.

The propagation mechanism in ABCT actually occurs during the boom and it’s capital markets. Note, the propagation mechanism is still money, but this time it’s an excess supply of fiduciary media that pushes up the prices of inputs (i.e. an increased demand for certain products) and creates malinvestment throughout the capital structure. At the turning point, the entire economy is already affected, because it’s not just certain industries subject to liquidation, but a large chunk of the capital structure in general. This goes a long way to explain the recession/depression, even without invoking the role of the secondary monetary contraction that occurs (debt liquidation and corresponding financial problems).

Going back to the emphasis on the demand-side shock that the ABCT describes, I’ll end this post with a comment concerning one sentence in Lars’ post,

I[n] my view Austrians often fail to explain why a reallocation of economic resources will have to lead to a recession.

I think that right here Lars should start re-thinking his interpretation of ABCT as a supply-side theory. If it really were a supply side theory he would be right. Austrians would need a propagation mechanism, and market monetarists have the perfect one: a monetary contraction. But, ABCT is not a supply side theory, it’s a demand side theory. This is also where Krugman’s critique of ABCT falls apart. Why can there be something close to full employment during the lengthening part (the boom), but there’s mass unemployment during the contraction? Well, because there’s a demand shock. A demand shock implies some degree of pricing chaos, a lot of uncertainty, and fundamental changes to preferences, and so the market has to coordinate through the fog, and this might take some time. Nonetheless, I think Lars and I are in agreement that the secondary deflation, or the monetary contraction, also has a big role to play in explaining the extent of the bust — a role that ABCT alone can’t fulfill.

Uncertainty and the Structure of Production

A question I’ve been thinking about for some time is whether some institutional advancements are required for a lengthening of the structure of production. What I have in mind is the need to deal with the uncertainty of long-term expectations, where the more detached the production of a particular good is from the final consumer good the more uncertainty there is regarding its eventual value. Then I realized that the Hayekian structure of production does exactly this. By splitting the production process into stages we can deal with uncertainty by restricting the scope of planning.

The most general explanation of the structure of production goes something as follows. The production of consumers’ goods requires certain inputs, which we’ll call capital goods or producers’ goods (the former usually doesn’t include “original factors of production,” which are things like labor and land, while the latter does). These capital goods, in turn, may also require certain inputs. The demand for these inputs can be explained through the Hayekian concept of the Ricardo effect. A rise in savings is tantamount to a fall in present demand for consumers’ good, which will increase relative wages in that stage. Rising costs of labor incentivize demand for labor-saving devices, or inputs — we can increase productivity with less labor. Rising demand for these inputs, in turn, will cause the unemployed labor in later stages to be drawn to earlier stages. The fundamental scarcity of labor also creates a demand for capital goods, but Austrians hold that a lengthening of the structure of production (in terms of stages, not in terms of time) requires an increase in savings (i.e. a fall in time preference).

The size of each stage is at least partially decided by uncertainty. Entrepreneurs invest as long as they expect that revenue will cover the costs of production and interest. The longer the time period that the production process takes, the more uncertain that revenue becomes. It makes sense that stages of production are therefore limited by “optimal expectations.” Another way of saying the same thing is that uncertainty will limit the extent of vertical integration.

This is also basically another way of restating the importance of money prices, and why horizontal and vertical integration leads to calculation problems. Autonomous stages of production means that stages are divided by money prices, and these prices will reflect expectations between stages. Based on the Hayekian concept of local knowledge, by limiting the “length” of the stage it allows money prices to reflect the best information, since expectations will be limited to what the entrepreneur knows best. (Note, this isn’t the same as arguing that decision-making should be completely decentralized — as Coase posited, the scope of the firm will be decided by the market, or more precisely by the costs of using and not using the pricing process.) If prices reflect more accurate information, then these prices will help better coordinate present investment with future consumption.

It may be that the concept of the structure of production is already widely accepted, although then this is hidden in some obscure papers. But, this uncertainty based explanation of a multi-stage structure of production may be a great way of re-introducing the concept into mainstream economic theory. It’s only a minor step beyond the already widely written about theory of the limits to the organization of the firm, based on the Misesian calculation problem.

On Deficits

I’ve read two interesting challenges to the “deficits are bad” mantra.

The first isn’t new, but I haven’t talked about it before. Yesterday, Paul Krugman lightly critiqued David Stockman’s recent NYT column, “The Corruption of Capitalism in America.” Here Stockman isn’t talking about the federal deficit, but the current account deficit (i.e. the trade deficit) and debt more generally, but I’ll extend the discussion to the national debt. Krugman makes the following point,

What I want to point out is the way Stockman unintentionally makes a point I’ve been trying to get across: debt does not directly impoverish us, because it’s money we owe to ourselves.

I’m aware of the debate that exists regarding whether this is a true claim or not, but I think I mostly agree with Krugman (and, I don’t think he’s claiming that everyone gains, but rather that society as a whole doesn’t lose). The problem isn’t the debt per sé, but what this debt is financing. For instance, it shouldn’t be too controversial that much of the leveraging during the second half of the 1990s and during the 2000s led to the misallocation of real sources. The real debate regarding deficit spending, and government expenditure more generally, is whether or not it leads to a misallocation of real goods, or at least whether the misallocation that occurs through federal spending is worse than that which would occur on the market. This is the kind of criticism that I brought up in my 2011 piece.

Related, here is something that is equally as unsophisticated as simply claiming that all debt (or all public debt) is bad,

The classic answer, the one that has been associated with the name of John Maynard Keynes, is that if the private sector won’t spend enough to maintain full employment, the public sector must take up the slack. Let the government borrow money and use the funds to finance public investment projects — if possible to good purpose, but that is a secondary consideration — and thereby provide jobs, which will make people more willing to spend, which will generate still more jobs, and so on.

— Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: Norton, 2009), p. 71.

I have in mind, specifically, the claim that whether or not public resource allocation is “to good purpose” is secondary. It assumes that the opportunity cost of the use of “idle resources” is essentially zero, but it seems to me that this is a ridiculous claim to make. One of the biggest critiques of classical economics is that it didn’t have a proper theory of idleness, but in reality the classical theory of unemployment (extended by economists such as W.H. Hutt [The Theory of Idle Resources; see my review] and F.A. Hayek [Prices and Production]) seems much, much more sophisticated than the Keynesian alternative.

The second challenge was posed by blogger “Lord Keynes” on Bob Murphy’s blog,

[I]f the government cut taxes radically during a recession (without increasing spending) and ran a deficit to create a stimulus, do you think that would stimulate the economy or not?

Here’s a restatement: If the level of public expenditure remains zero, but the government decides to cut taxes in response to a recession, what would you say about the deficit? This is more evidence that it’s not really about the debt. It’s about what that debt is financing. Maybe we can say that debt is heterogeneous.

The Price of Disorder

I originally had written down some longer thoughts on Paul Krugman’s “The Price is Wrong,” but I feel that I should save these for the future, when they’re more developed. For the time being, Krugman’s point is a good one. I tentatively disagree that the main problem is too high a rate of interest (especially if the belief is that the current natural rate is somewhere below zero — this implies that society values x future goods more than x present goods), but I agree that there’s more to the story of the recession than just price rigidity (caused by government intervention or otherwise).

The gist of my longer thoughts is that the recession is fundamentally different to the boom, because the turning point represents such a large shock that individuals’ utility functions are bound to change dramatically. This suggests a degree of discontinuity between the boom and the bust, even if the roots of the bust are in the boom. But, this doesn’t offer much in the way of specifics as to the problem to be solved during recessions/depressions (and I don’t mean the problem to be solved by policy, just the problem to be solved generally speaking) — my views are much more uncertain than they were when I wrote this. For the time being, my advice is that there’s more to the non-Austrian view than we, at first, are willing to recognize.