Question on Slavery

Elsewhere, I’ve been involved in a discussion on the economics of slavery. I mentioned Robert Fogel’s and Stanley Engerman’s Time on the Cross, which argues — and this is a very simplified paraphrase — that slavery is not everywhere and always unprofitable. In fact, Engerman co-authored a paper with Kenneth Sokoloff, “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World,” where they use a similar argument to explain institutional divergence in different parts of the Americas. The argument is that industries affected by economies of scale, where fixed costs are relatively high, are better suited for slave labor (or, otherwise, low-paid wage labor).

The intuition is that, given economies of scale, comparatively large quantities of output are necessary to push down average costs, thereby requiring relatively large labor inputs. This is especially true where the industry is relatively labor intensive, which was the case during the early colonization of the Americas (relatively capital intensive industry began to appear around the 1840s, and then took off in the United States following the U.S. Civil War). Engerman and Sokoloff posit that the geographic distribution of these different industries is decided by geographic factor endowments. Further, producers in these geographic areas will tend to specialize in industries that are intensive in the good that is locally abundant. This follows from the Heckscher–Ohlin trade model (the idea is that local abundance drives the opportunity cost of these resources down, giving that area a comparative advantage).

I suggest that Fogel and Engerman’s book is the definitive study on American slavery. Not everyone agrees, I guess; I was pointed to a crical review of the book by Mark Thornton, “Slavery, Profitability, and the Market Process.”

In any case, I made a number of points as to why it’s not probable that slavery is a profitable means of employment, for the employer, in an advance economies,

  1. There is the classic incentives argument, which says that differences in payment will alter incentives, implying that low wage (or, in our case, unpaid) labor has less of an incentive to maximize productivity;
  2. Influenced by George Reisman’s argument, elucidated in his book Capitalism, on the fundamental scarcity of labor, I suggest that as the division of labor grows, and the competition for labor rises, the option of enslavement — unless slavery is institutionalized through law — disappears. As the marginal productivity of labor rises, and therefore so do wages, workers will simply opt to move to industries where wages are highest.

These are the typical, superficial arguments as to why slavery eventually peters out as a viable means of employment. But, inspired by an excerpt from Don Lavoie’s Rivalry and Central Planning, I wonder if Mises’ calculation argument offers a different path to explaining the downfall of slavery’s viability (in relatively advanced divisions of labor). Mises’ case against socialism boils down to a knowledge problem, but one that specifically deals with the problem of imputation. In a nutshell, Carl Menger, in Principles of Economics, develops a subjective theory of value, where factor of productions’ value is determined by means of imputation, which means that they’re derived from the values attached to the final consumer goods, whose values are directly determined by their (subjective) benefits. The problem was that there was no convincing price theory which explains how exactly these values come to be known. Friedrich von Wieser thereafter developed his own theory of “natural value,” where, as I understand it, these values are exogenous to the market process. Unconvinced by this theory, Mises (Boris Brutzkus, Nicolas Pierson, and Max Weber developed similar theories independently — see Hayek’s Collectivist Economic Planning and Individualism and Economic Order) advanced a novel alternative hypothesis, which argues that only a competitive market process, based on the institution of private property, can allow for price formation. And, only through price formation can the values of factors of production be known to firms, who can use these prices to choose between alternative means, and also rely on profit and loss accounting to track their efficiency.

Labor is a factor of production, so its value must be imputed from the final product. Specifically, following Böhm-Bawerk’s law of costs, since labor — to an imperfect extent — is a relatively mobile factor, the value of the marginal worker will be imputed from the least valuable alternative end (because, if this worker were drop out of the labor market, the firm would sacrifice the least valuable attainable end, rather than the most — in other words, the opportunity cost is the alternative end with the lowest value). The price of labor gives firms added information regarding the value of the labor they employ, allowing firms (and labor itself) to allocate its employees in a relatively efficient way. Where the marginal productivity of labor is very low, this issue loses some relevance. But, as the marginal productivity of labor rises, if slavery is institutionalized in such a way that it sacrifices the bidding process allowed by a frequent movement of labor, it suffers from the fact that the lack of market prices (apart from the initial cost of acquisition) will make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for firms to efficiently allocate their labor. The result is that slave-employing firms will be at a competitive disadvantage relative to wage-paying firms producing the same goods.

Does this sound like a plausible thesis? Skimming over the above-linked Thornton article, he advances a similar argument. Has anybody else made the same argument? I think this theory fits nicely with the work done by Engerman and Fogel. Their theory, as aforementioned, relies on the assumption of economies of scale and labor-intensive industries. Imagine labor intensity as a ratio between the quantity of labor employed to the quantity of capital employed (L/K). With capital accumulation, this ratio should become smaller (L/K↑), meaning the capital intensity of the industry is increasing. Capital is what raises the productivity of labor, and therefore raises wages. With capital accumulation, and therefore economic growth, slavery becomes gradually more uncompetitive. As argued in, for example, Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail, southern production remained relatively labor intensive, even as northern industry became more-and-more capital intensive. This is probably why the profitability of slavery, in the south, was not drastically challenged during the first half of the 19th century.

Finally, in passing, what this all suggests is that, in the context of perfect markets, slavery should become nonviable with industrialization and mechanization. The problem is institutional. Not only was slavery institutionalized in the South, but Southern institutions were generally more extractive than those of the North. The South, relative to their Northern brethren, were less innovative, and the economy was less competitive. This is related to the factor endowments argument, but that slavery didn’t fade on its own is also a product of the effort that entrenched interests put in to make sure that their way of doing business isn’t forced into irrelevancy through competition. In other words, there’s also a political dimension to the problem of slavery. I don’t think we can divorce markets from politics (or, institutions more broadly), but this is a point consider.

Quote of the Week

Self-organizing social systems economize on the knowledge people need to pursue their goals successfully. Science, the market, and democracy are so complex that no human being can grasp them except by using a theory divorced from concrete details. Such a theory, however, can provide little or no guidance in making specific decisions within such an order. Few economists are successful entrepreneurs, few political scientists win public office, and few philosophers of science do valuable scientific research. The skills required to succeed within a spontaneous order are little connected to the skills needed to understand it.

— Gus diZerega, “Market Non-Neutrality: Systemic Bias in Spontaneous Orders,” Critical Review 11, 1 (1997), p. 123.

Ryan Murphy on McCloskey

Ryan Murphy reminds me of why I need to read Deidre McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity,

Institutions cannot be viewed merely as incentive-providing constraints.

— “Why Neo-Institutionalism Can’t Explain the Modern World: A Pamplet

As of late, I’m becoming a huge fan of Douglass North’s work on institutions. If you haven’t already, I recommend his Understanding the Process of Economic Change. It’s not his most in-depth work, but it’s a good summary of his research, and if you like it you can get into his other stuff from there. He also has plenty of articles you may find online. One of the most interesting things about North is that he takes the concept of transaction costs — costs to using the pricing process — to explain the reason we have institutions at all, and this has really informed my view on market failure, what determines the distribution of income, et cetera.

But, McCloskey adds, I guess one could say, a “human touch.” As noted, I have yet to read the book, but as I understand it, McCloskey’s intention is to argue that economists shouldn’t divorce institutions from humanity, since it’s humanity which gives these institutions meaning. It’s actually a very Hayekian point. It reminds me of Hayek’s “The Meaning of Competition.” If you assume institutional constraints as given, or divorced from society, then you miss out on the process of institutional formation. It’s the day-to-day interaction between agents which creates the process of institutional change, based largely on how social norms change based on our experiences. Hayek made the same point with regards to competition, contra the model of perfect competition which assumes away the process. The same could be said of Mises’ theory of economic calculation, which Hayek later expanded upon in his work on knowledge. You can’t divorce price from the day-to-day bidding process.

McCloskey’s book (and the prequel, The Bourgeois Virtues) has been sitting on my shelf for almost a year. It’s been my loss, and it’s a big loss. It’s one of my “must reads” for the summer, where I don’t have any excuses.

Ten Rules for the Internet Economist

Here are some general principles I’ve derived from my experience. These are all for fun,

  1. If someone uses the word “obvious” to describe their idea, there’s a high probability that it’s not so obvious;
  2. On the internet, nobody knows what they’re talking about when it concerns the volatility of gold stocks;
  3. The more certain about their conclusions someone is, the more skeptical you should be about those conclusion’s validity;
  4. (This one is for writers. Yes, I do need to follow my own advice more.) If you think your reader “didn’t get the point,” high odds say your post wasn’t as clear as you thought it was or you’re wrong — practically, no odds say your reader is wrong;
  5. If someone accuses you of indoctrination, it’s more likely that person is indoctrinated;
  6. If, in a debate, someone resorts to listing all the supposed logical fallacies you’ve made, walk away;
  7. There is more to economics than Keynes and Hayek;
  8. The more the author uses umbrella terms to describe ideas they disagree with — e.g. “Keynesian,” “statist,” “cult-like,” et cetera —, the more skeptical you should be of their conclusions;
  9. If someone accuses you of not knowing “basic” economics, it’s likely that they themselves don’t know “basic” economics;
  10. If someone asks you to go read something (unless it’s their own work), there’s a high likelihood that they don’t understand the argument well enough to restate it themselves.

Against Half Baked Legalization

I’m an advocate of drug legalization. I believe that drug prohibition has not worked to curb drug consumption, and, in fact, that it has driven drug consumers to more harmful substances (see, for example, Mark Thornton’s, “What Explains Crystal Meth?“). I question the legitimacy of forcefully limiting drug consumption, in the first place. I’m also of the opinion that if drugs were legalized, competition would drive the quality of drugs up. This includes gradually making them less dangerous, or developing better substitutes. But, are all changes towards full legalization equally as good? Half steps may actually make the path towards legalization more difficult than they otherwise would be. California provides a perfect case study.

In 2010, a ballot initiative was introduced to legalize marijuana. Specifically, the law would allow persons 21 and over to hold up to 28.5 grams of marijuana and the ability to grow small amounts of the plant at home for personal use. It also would open the drug to taxation and wholesale commercial production, by licensed firms. More information on the initiative is available on Wikipedia. Prop 19 failed to pass the elections, with 54.5 percent of Californian voters choosing “no.”

According to one poll, 52 percent of Americans support the legalization of marijuana. If we take this as a cross-country mean, my guess is that the statistic for California is marginally greater than or equal to 52 percent. So, why did Prop 19 fail at the ballot? One explanation is that there was insufficient advertisement of the initiative, implying that those who did vote were a non-random sample of Californian voters — that is, the voting population was biased against marijuana. I think this probably has some truth to it. It’s also true that California has a significant population of conservatives, so the typical belief that California is a relatively liberal state may not always be true. But, another major impediment to the initiative’s passing was the fact that California growers, who supply the medical marijuana industry, opposed the legalization attempt.

California has a large market for marijuana. Much of it is legal, thanks to the legalization (Prop 215) of medical marijuana in 1996. California dispensaries are supplied, in large part, by local growers. A more comprehensive marijuana legalization threatened to depress the price of the plant, for two major reasons,

  1. It was expected that the number of suppliers would increase;
  2. The legalization of limited personal production would have decreased demand for suppliers’ product.

Current cannabis growers are not interested in competition or falling prices, because it means a loss of market share and profits. Thus, in California, they put a lot of money, time, and effort into blocking the passing of Prop 19. Had the marijuana industry been behind the initiative — or, even, neutral —, I’m sure Prop 19 probably would have passed.

This brings up the question of whether we should be careful when proposing incremental legislation, with the long-term objective of full legalization. In California we see that the legalization of marijuana created a new marijuana industry, and the profitability of this industry created an incentive for the industry to oppose further legalization. I don’t know the details of how California’s growers opposed Prop 19 very well, but, whether indirectly or directly, the creation of the industry created the opportunity for rent-seeking, and this has hurt the chances of full legalization. Now, public opinion has to change to a sufficient degree to overcome the industrial opposition, and Californians have to deal with the risk of voting for diluted future propositions, with terms that may be more favorable for current cannabis growers.

In other words, it may be a superior strategy to just wait for the right time to push for full legalization, because in our current environment there’s too much of a risk of unintentionally creating entrenched interests that actually hurt your long-term objectives. It’s really too bad, because marijuana is one of those goods where it no longer makes much sense to prohibit it. In California, I don’t think it’s a stretch to claim that over 50 percent of residents have consumed weed (I’d put the figure closer to ¾ of total residents). It’s already accepted in our popular culture. By now, in my opinion, a progressive society would have fully legalized it. But, a premature medical use legalization has put at risk short term legalization for the sake of a very limited gain — you’re almost just as well off continuing to buy the drug illegally, since the prices and quality are about the same.

This is something other states should definitely consider when they start to discuss the legalization of marijuana in their own legislatures. In some states, such as Colorado and Washington, the time may be ripe to just try full legalization (although, maybe not). But, in other states the odds may not be so favorable. In these states, it may be worthwhile just to wait for the right time, rather than opt for half baked measures that may make legalization more difficult in the long-run.

Advocates of Reason: 9 May 2013

 Man has only one tool to fight error: reason.

Ludwig von Mises

1. A ghostwriter (not me) cites an old Mises Daily of mine. A tip: I don’t recommend posting your essays on these kinds of websites. You’re not going to make much money ghostwriting, unless you upload a huge volume of papers. Instead, you should approach it like a business, advertise, and write unique, fresh papers for all your clients. It pays off; you make much more money this way (I would never sell a ~4,000 word essay for $70). Another tip: don’t buy essays from these websites. A lot of professors simply copy and paste entire essays into Google to discover plagiarism, and the tactic works very well. Essays from websites where parts of the essay are published, so that the client can take a look at the quality prior to purchase, are especially susceptible. In any case, you commonly need to establish a temporary dialogue with whoever you hire, because you will get feedback on your essay and you will need someone to make the necessary changes. Final tip: honestly, write the essay yourself.

2. Chris Dillow, “A Case for Inequality,”

Instead, the causes of inequality lie in institutions and ideology. On the one hand, the US has institutions and ideologies which engender “winner take all” markets in which CEOs and “superstars” — of either an Adler (pdf) or Rosen (pdf) type — can get very rich. On the other hand, Scandinavians have strong welfare states which reduce income inequality but – by deterring saving amongst the middlingly poor – increase wealth inequality.

The first sentence is key. The theory of distribution abstracts from institutional concerns, but it’s really institutions which determine the distribution of income. This is why I spend so much time criticizing “productivity” theories of inequality. Accepting this doesn’t make you a “statist,” or a “Keynesian.” You can take a Hayekian position, admit that institutions are imperfect, and argue that the best institutional improvements arise spontaneously through decentralized decision making.

3. Matt Zwolinski on why he isn’t an anarchist,

Anarchism of this sort thus demands from us an enormous confidence in the power of human reason to radically redesign and improve evolved social institutions. And it is precisely this sort of confidence that classical liberals have long warned us to be wary of.

This sound similar to the argument I made here. The whole piece (plus the earlier essays in the same discussion) is worth reading.

4. Atlético de Madrid, the team I have been following almost since I was born, has directly qualified for the Champions League for the first time in 17 years (we qualified for the atletico madrid plato campeones2007/08 and 2008/09 Champions League seasons, as well, but only through playoffs). If it sounds unimpressive, consider the fact that we’re Spain’s third most decorated team. Historically, we’ve fared pretty poorly in Europe’s top competition, but I’m hoping that with Diego Simeone — a manager that has won us two pieces of silverware, and qualified us for the domestic Cup final, in his year and a half so far — Fortune will shine upon us. By the way, I still remember receiving a commemorate plate (for winning the league and the domestic cup) from a family friend when I was nine years old. He’s a culé (Barcelona fan), but he knew how crazy I was/am about the team. It’s weird because I’m the only Atleti fan in my household. My grandfather is a Madridista (Real Madrid fan), and a pretty die-hard one at that.

5. I wonder if, in some stateless parallel universe, every time private defense fails to solve a crime a blogger writes, “Wow, if we had publicly funded police none of this would happen!” Then I wonder if some obscure blogger writes a blog post on how radical statists should be more skeptical, because publicly funded police stations can only work if they appear spontaneously.

What’s So General about the General Theory?

Bruce Bartlett considers the title of John M. Keynes’ magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, an “unfortunate error.” According to Bartlett, Keynes’ core insight is the liquidity trap, which he defines as a situation where both inflation and interest rates are low, making bonds and money close substitutes. Thus, Keynes’ economics are mostly applicable only when an economy is in a liquidity trap. I think Bartlett has it mostly wrong. The liquidity trap only plays a small role in The General Theory, and the book’s major contribution — at least, as intended by Keynes — is its business cycle theory.

If you’re wondering what the liquidity trap is, I give an overview of the development of the theory in a June 2010 Mises Daily, “Krugman contra Hayek.” Most of my overview is based on a paper by Mauro Boianovsky, “The IS-LM Model and the Liquidity Trap Concept: from Hicks to Krugman.” A modern interpretation of the liquidity trap theory is provided by Paul Krugman, in his 1998 paper on Japan. Krugman’s definition is a bit more general: when conventional monetary policy no longer stimulates, otherwise known as the zero lower bound (ZLB).

How big of a role does the liquidity trap play in The General Theory? In Keynes’ 1936 book, the liquidity trap is mentioned, in passing, in chapter 15,

There is the possibility, for the reasons discussed above, that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest.

— p. 207.

Keynes suggested, with healthy skepticism, that the early 1930s may be an example of a liquidity trap, but that these cases are indeed very rare. It certainly is not the centerpiece of Keynes’ theoretical exposition. In fact, the liquidity trap is probably better identified with John R. Hicks (who later repudiated much of his work from “Mr. Keynes and the Classics“), who also introduced the IS/LM diagram taught in intermediate macroeconomics. In any case, none of the theories that Keynes developed in his book were specific to the liquidity trap, nor require the liquidity trap as a precondition for their validity.

Keynes’ main argument, in my opinion, consists of an integration of R.F. Kahn’s multiplier with the macroeconomic framework Keynes began to develop in his A Treatise on Money (and volume II). The main purpose of The General Theory is to explain how an underemployment equilibrium may arise, and Keynes’ theory is that cyclical fluctuations are caused by increases in the stock of savings which cannot be met with greater investment. The theory is similar to monetary disequilibrium, but rather than an increase in the demand for money and sticky prices, the shock in aggregate demand is caused by a sudden reversal of entrepreneurs’ expectations (more on the differences between the two theories here).

The most well known term associated with Keynes is “animal spirits,” but at first he actually frames his theory as a secular outcome of economic growth. As an economy becomes more productive and incomes grow, the propensity to save tends to grow at a faster rate than the marginal propensity to consume. In other words, the proportion of saving to consumption increases over time. A tenet of the Keynes–Kahn multiplier is that present investment is directly derived, by and large, from present consumption. As consumption falls, the scope of investment falls, and vice versa. It follows that at some point savings is bound to increase beyond the point it can be profitably invested, causing an aggregate demand shock. Drawing on “animal spirits” helps with the application of this theory, since recurring waves of optimism and pessimism can cause the sudden changes in expectations that leads to a shortage of investment. But, “animal spirits” is not a central component of the “general theory.”

In the course of explaining his theory, and its many components, Keynes offered two main challenges to what he termed Classical economics. The first, early on, is that wages aren’t sticky, rather they may not be able to fall in real terms, at all. He posited that since labor makes up a significant portion of the costs of production, a nominal reduction in wages will lead to a proprotional nominal reduction in the price of output, leaving real wages the same. By doing this, he circumvented the typical explanation for mass unemployment: the artificial rigidities created by interventionism. Second, he engaged the believe that savings and investment is well equilibrated by the rate of interest. He argued that the interest rate is not only determined by time preference, but also by liquidity preference — interest on non-cash assets have to include a premium to make up for their relative illiquidity. If a high liquidity preference increases the rate of interest well beyond its equilibrium, or natural, level, there will be some discoordination between savings and investment, leading to or aggravating a demand shock.

What’s the general theory, then? All of this is explained within the context of a novel macroeconomic framework. Keynes was advancing a theory of the coordination of several macroeconomic aggregates: investment, savings, consumption, interest, et cetera. He argued that capitalist economies are prone to demand shocks — not under special circumstances, but generally. And, actually, referring to Keynes’ theory as a business cycle theory may be somewhat misleading, because the business cycle theory is really only secondary to the macro framework Keynes was attempting to construct. That is, demand shortages are only a part of the broader theory of Keynes’ vision of how economies work on aggregate: investment, and therefore employment, is determined by the expected demand for final output. Keynes relegated supply-side considerations to the back burner.

Maybe by “core insight” Bartlett means the key concept that economists took from Keynes. But, even then, I think he’s wrong. The key, and in my opinion erroneous, belief is that present demand for consumers’ goods output determines the scope of present investment, especially without considering supply side qualifiers that would radically change the implications of Keynes’ general theory. It’s this idea that informs the opinion that consumption drives the economy (and that to restore aggregate demand we must stimulate consumption). It’s this relationship which is one of the most important facets of Keynes’ general theory of macroeconomic coordination.

Also, briefly, I’m not sure just how skeptical of monetary policy Keynes was. I recommend two papers on the topic: D. Moggridge and S. Howson, “Keynes on Monetary Policy;” and E. Dickens, “Keynes’s Theory of Monetary Policy.” Also, Hicks discussed some differences on monetary policy between Keynes and Ralph Hawtrey, in his book Economic Perspectives.